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Case No. 20081068-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Petitioner, 
vs. 
SUSAN TRIPP, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State 
submits this brief in reply to new matters raised in the respondent's brief. 
A. The court of appeals' requirement that the State produce clear 
and positive testimony of unequivocal consent imposes an 
impermissible burden of proof. 
The appropriate burden of proof in establishing the fact of consent at a 
suppression hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125,1 56, 63 P.3d 650 ('Hansen IF). Tripp so acknowledges in point LA of 
her brief. See Resp. Brf. at 13-14 & n.7. She argues, however, that this Court has 
not rejected that portion of the old Ham test. Resp. Brf. at 10-11. She further 
contends that the clear, positive, and unequivocal standard applied by the court 
of appeals did not refer to "the quantum of proof required/7 but rather to "the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
substance of the evidence to be shown" by the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. Resp. Brf. at 13. Tripp's arguments lack merit. 
Contrary to Tripp's claim, this Court in Hansen II rejected the Ham test 
outright: 
[T]he standard used by the court of appeals to determine 
voluntariness imposed too heavy a burden on the State. To prove 
voluntariness, the court of appeals required the State to show by 
clear, positive, and unequivocal testimony that Hansen's consent 
was freely and intelligently given. Additionally, it indulged every 
reasonable presumption against waiver of Hansen's constitutional 
rights. This standard is incorrect. 
Hansen II, 2002 UT125, ]f 52 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The 
Court reaffirmed the standard applied by the United States Supreme Court: 
The appropriate standard to determine voluntariness is the 
totality of the circumstances test, and the burden of proof is by 
preponderance of the evidence. Under the totality of the circumstances 
test, a court should carefully scrutinize both the details of the 
detention, and the characteristics of the defendant. 
The totality of the circumstances must show consent was 
given without duress or coercion. 
Id. at \ \ 56-57 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, 
Hansen II implicitly recognized the "clear, positive, and unequivocal testimony" 
requirement as imposing an inappropriate burden of proof and reaffirmed that 
"the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence." 
-2-
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Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, "the proponent has 
the burden of persuading the trier of fact . . . that the asserted proposition is 
more likely than not." Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043,1046 (Utah 1975). 
Unlike proof beyond a reasonable doubt, preponderance of the evidence "allows 
for considerable doubt in the fact finder's mind as to the correctness of the 
judgment." In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085,1091 (Utah 1981). Accordingly, the trial 
court below was simply required "to balance the [State's] evidence, using 
discretion to weigh its importance and credibility, and decide whether [Tripp] 
ha[d] more likely than not" consented to the blood draw. State v. Hodges, 798 
P.2d 270,279 (Utah App.), cert denied, No. 900501 (Utah 1990). 
The court of appeals below instead insisted that the State prove consent 
by clear, positive, and unequivocal testimony. See State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 
388,116,197 P.3d 99. The court of appeals acknowledged that Tripp extended 
her arm when Brian Davis, the blood technician, asked if he could apply a 
tourniquet to see if he could find an easy site to draw blood. Id. The court of 
appeals also acknowledged that Davis then said that " 'we can go ahead and 
[take] care of this'" and that Tripp did not withdraw her arm or say no in 
-3-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
response. Id. at ^ 16-17 (citing R. 533: 95).l The court of appeals concluded, 
however, that this evidence was insufficient under the clear, positive, and 
unequivocal standard, where Davis "immediately" drew Tripp's blood "without 
an express indication of her consent." Id. at | 16. It also criticized Davis' 
comment that he could "'go ahead and [take] care of this'" as "ambiguous." 
The court of appeals' insistence on clear and positive evidence of 
unequivocal consent is incompatible with the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. Indeed, unequivocal is defined as "leaving no doubt" or "leading to 
only one conclusion." Webster's Third New IntT Dictionary 2494 (1993) 
(emphasis added). Yet, as discussed, the preponderance of the evidence 
standard "allows for considerable doubt." In re Boyer, 636 P.2d at 1091. 
Moreover, this Court in Hansen II recognized that Hansen's response to the 
officer's request for consent in that case was "ambiguous," but nevertheless 
concluded that it could not be said that the trial court's finding was clearly 
erroneous. Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, | 50. 
1
 Tripp complains that the trial court did not account for the fact that 
Davis could not recall whether or not she told him to stop. Resp. Brf. at 17. The 
victim advocate, however, testified that Tripp never told him to stop. See R. 533: 
80. The trial court's finding that Tripp "never tried to withdraw her arm a n d . . . 
never said 'no' or 'stop'" was thus supported by the record and not clearly 
erroneous. 
-4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Unlike Hansen II, the defense in this case introduced some testimony 
against a finding of consent. See R. 106-46. But despite conflicting testimony, 
the State's evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding of consent 
by a preponderance of the evidence. As such, the trial court's factual finding of 
consent cannot be said to be clearly erroneous — the standard required to reverse 
factual findings. Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, \ 48. It was improper for the court of 
appeals to impose an elevated burden and substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court's findings. See id. 
In sum, Utah courts "court must follow [the Supreme Court's] 
interpretation of consent under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Bisner, 2001 
UT 99,146,37 P.3d 1073. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court 
have held that at a suppression hearing, the State must prove the facts by a 
preponderance of the evidence based on the totality of the circumstances. See 
Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, | 56; United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164,178 (1974). It 
was inappropriate for the court of appeals to impose additional requirements. 
B. Appellate courts may supplement the trial court's factual 
findings with undisputed evidence from the suppression 
hearing. 
In points LB and II. A of her brief, Resp. Brf. at 15-28, Tripp challenges the 
trial court's factual findings as they relate to the determination of whether she 
voluntarily consented to the blood draw. Her challenge to the factual findings, 
-5-
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however, rests primarily with what facts were omitted, rather than with their 
accuracy. Indeed, the determination of whether consent was given voluntarily 
depends on the totality of the circumstances. Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, f 57. 
Accordingly, the facts of the case are critical. See id. at 15 (recognizing that "the 
legal analysis of a search and seizure case is 'highly fact dependent'") (citation 
omitted). For this reason, the law is well settled that appellate courts may 
supplement "the trial court's factual findings . . . with relevant, objective facts 
gleaned from testimony given during the evidentiary hearing." Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 2005 UT 13, f 1 n.l, 122 P.3d 506, rev'd on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 
(2006). The State agrees that the Court may do so here.2 
The State agrees that not all evidence relevant to a review of the issue here 
was included in the factual findings. Such omissions, however, do not make the 
findings clearly erroneous, but merely incomplete. Accordingly, the State 
agrees that the Court may supplement the factual findings with undisputed 
testimony in the record. However, where the evidence was disputed, the Court 
2
 The Court in Stuart later refused to expand the scope of reviewable facts 
to include evidence from the suppression hearing because the State did not 
specifically ask it to do so in its petition for a writ of certiorari. Stuart, 2005 UT 
13, \ 6. The State believes, however, that as in appeals of right, this Court in 
discretionary appeals should also look at the entire record upon which the 
litigants rely, with or without a specific request to do so in the petition. 
-6-
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should "resolve all conflicts and doubts in favor of . . . the [trial court's] 
ruling[]." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1989). 
C. Tripp's consent was voluntary. 
In its opinion, the court of appeals blurred the line between the factual 
determination of whether consent was given and the legal determination of 
whether the consent was voluntary. See State v. Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, ]f f 14-
17,197 P.3d 99. In point LB of her brief, Tripp also seems to blur that line. See 
Resp. Brf. at 15-20. The State admits, however, that it too blurred that line in its 
opening brief. See Pet. Brf. at 16-18. To clarify, whether consent was given is a 
finding of fact subject to clear error review. Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, f^ 48. 
Whether that consent was voluntary "is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed 
for correctness." Id. at Tf 51. 
* * * 
As explained in Hansen II, "the totality of the circumstances must show 
consent was given without duress or coercion. In other words, a person's will 
cannot be overborne, nor may 'his capacity for self-determination [be] critically 
impaired.'" Hansen II, 2002 UT 125,157 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218,225 (1973)) (other internal citations omitted). In examining the totality 
of the circumstances, "a court should carefully scrutinize both the details of the 
detention, and the characteristics of the defendant." Id. at ]f 56. Contrary to the 
-7-
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court of appeals' conclusion and Tripp's claim on certiorari, the relevant facts 
here show that the consent was voluntary. 
Tripp contends that her consent was involuntary because police 
"demanded" that she submit to a blood draw. Resp. Brf. at 18. Tripp also 
contends that she was "being restrained in a police car by a police officer and 
two other state actors, who took her blood without her permission as she was 
crying, panicked and pulling away." Resp. Brf. at 19. These allegations are not 
supported by the facts. 
Tripp complains that the findings did not account for the fact that 
Detective Roberts believed he had the right to demand a blood draw under the 
implied consent statute. Resp. Brf. at 22. That may be, but the law is well 
settled that "the issue is not [the officer's] state of mind, but the objective effect 
of his actions." Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334,338-39 n.2 (2000). A review of 
the record reveals that despite his understanding of the law, Detective Roberts 
never demanded that Tripp submit to the blood draw. Instead, he repeatedly 
attempted to obtain her consent. 
When Tripp's family began to interfere with the investigation, Roberts 
told Tripp that "she was in custody[,] removed her ... to the back of [his] 
unmarked patrol car," informed her that he was "going to obtain a warrant" to 
"force the blood draw," and left her with the victim advocate. R. 533:16-17,28-
-8-
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29. When Brian Davis, the blood technician, arrived on the scene, Roberts 
attempted to send him away, explaining that Tripp had refused consent because 
of a fear of needles. R. 533:18. He told Davis that it would take a couple of 
hours to get a warrant and he would call him back. R. 533:18. Had Roberts 
demanded the blood draw, he would not have tried to send Davis away. 
Neither was Tripp being restrained during the blood draw. Davis held 
her arm in order to apply the tourniquet. R. 525: 270-71. Cecelia Budd, the 
victim advocate, kneeled beside Tripp, not to restrain her, but to calm her. R. 
533: 75, 86, 95. As Davis applied the tourniquet to Tripp, Budd held her other 
hand and Tripp squeezed Budd's hand in return. R. 533:80. Budd told Tripp to 
look at her, not at the needle, and to take a deep breath. R. 533: 80. Officer 
Monson, who was standing in plain clothes outside the car, also shielded 
Tripp's eyes from the needle. R. 533:67. No one was physically restraining her. 
Tripp argues that the court of appeals7 correctly concluded that Davis 
used trickery to obtain consent. See Resp. Brf. at 15-17. Had Davis immediately 
drawn the blood after applying the tourniquet without further comment, the 
claim of trickery might carry some weight. However, he did not. After 
applying the tourniquet, Davis advised Tripp that it was an "easy site" and that 
they "could go ahead and take care of this." R. 533: 95. After Davis said that it 
was an "easy site" and that they "could go ahead and take care of this," Tripp 
-9-
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did not protest or pull her arm away, and thus signaled her willingness to 
submit to the blood draw at that time. No trickery was involved. Davis simply 
addressed her fear using a step-by-step approach. 
Moreover, Tripp was not "pulling away" in an effort to avoid the blood 
draw, as Tripp suggests. In response to a question about Tripp's "body 
language" during the blood draw, Officer Monson testified that "[s]he was 
pulling away" and "crying," but he also testified that she "offered her arm." R. 
533: 67. Given her fear of needles, Tripp may very well have pulled or leaned 
away with her body while offering her arm for the blood draw. Such would be 
a natural response from someone who feared needles. The "pulling away" body 
language was also the likely result of her turning her eyes from the needle, as 
counseled by Budd. 
After speaking with Detective Roberts, Davis returned to Tripp and said, 
"You know, just let me put the tourniquet on your arm, see if we can find a spot 
that would be easy to do this." R. 533: 94-95. Though still terrified of needles, 
Tripp responded, "Okay, we'll go ahead and do that." R. 533: 95. "At that 
point," and with the reassurance of the victim advocate, "she stuck her arm out 
for [Davis]." R. 533:95. After rolling up her sleeve and applying the tourniquet, 
Davis said to Tripp, "[I]t's an easy site, we can go ahead and take care of this." 
R. 533:95. Tripp did not protest and did not withdraw her arm. See R. 533: 89, 
-10-
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95. At that point, Davis inserted the needle in her arm and quickly withdrew 
the blood. R. 533: 95. "When the blood draw was over, the Tripp was 
immediately calm and stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought 
it would be." R. 159:117. 
Tripp complains that she was still panicky and afraid of the needles. Aplt. 
Brf. at 13. The State acknowledges that Tripp was still fearful of the needle and 
upset at the prospect of the blood draw. Davis spoke with Tripp for several 
minutes in an effort to reassure her and obtain her consent. R. 533: 93-94. In 
doing so, he also advised her that she had the right to counsel, the right to 
remain silent, and the right to refuse the blood draw. R. 533:93-94,102. He told 
her that "[i]t's a decision she had to make on her own." R. 533: 93. After about 
ten minutes of conversation, Davis believed he had reassured Tripp sufficiently 
to obtain her consent. R. 533: 93-94. Davis then left Tripp and told Detective 
Roberts that "we got her reassured and talked into this." R. 533: 94. 
As Davis prepared for the blood draw, the victim advocate held her hand 
during the process and Officer Monson shielded her eyes from the needle. R. 
533:67. The trial court also implicitly recognized this fact, finding that "[w]hen 
the blood draw was over, the Tripp was immediately calm and stated that the 
experience was not as bad as she thought it would be." R. 159, \ 17 (emphasis 
added). She nevertheless overcame that fear, offered her arm, and did not 
-11-
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withdraw her arm or otherwise protest when Davis said they "could go ahead 
and take care of this." R. 533: 95. 
In sum, the evidence at the suppression hearing does not support Tripp's 
contention that her consent "was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in 
submission to a claim of lawful authority." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233. The 
court's conclusion of voluntary consent is further buttressed by Davis's 
admonition to Tripp that she had the right to refuse the blood draw and that it 
was "a decision she had to make on her own," R. 533:93. See Hansen II, 2002 UT 
125,]f59n.6. 
D. Tripp's detention in the unmarked patrol car was supported by 
probable cause. 
In point II.B of her brief, Tripp contends that even if her consent was 
voluntary, the evidence should nevertheless be suppressed because the consent 
was the product of an illegal arrest. Resp. Brf. at 28-35. This claim fails. 
An arrest or custodial detention "is reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has 
been or is being committed." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,152 (2004). And 
under section 77-7-2 of the Utah Code, an officer may make a warrantless arrest 
when he or she "has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
-12-
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person arrested committed it." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (West 2004). 
Contrary to Tripp's claim, the facts known by police at the time of the 
investigation were sufficient to establish probable cause, justifying the custodial 
detention of Tripp. 
The intersection where the accident occurred was governed by a two-way 
stop sign for traffic on the Old Bingham Highway that gave the right of way to 
traffic on Highway U-l l l . See SE4, 5, & 34; R. 533: 57, 59. Tripp told Officer 
Saunders that she stopped at the stop sign, but then proceeded to cross the 
intersection. R. 533: 57. When she did so, she collided with the motorcycle 
driven by Daniel Pracht. R. 533:57. Although Tripp told Officer Saunders that 
she did not see Mr. Pracht (until after she hit him), nothing appeared to obstruct 
her view. R. 533:57. There were no buildings, trees, or bushes that impeded her 
line of sight to the motorcycle. R. 533: 58. And although the sun was setting, it 
was not in Tripp's eyes. R. 533:59. These facts created probable cause to believe 
that Tripp failed to yield the right of way to Mr. Pracht, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. 41-6-72.10(3) (West 2004) (making it a class C misdemeanor if driver 
fails to "yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching 
on another roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the 
time when the operator is moving across or within the intersection or junction of 
roadways"). 
-13-
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Additionally, officers knew that the injuries suffered by Mr. Pracht were 
likely to result in his death. R. 533: 9. He was "near death" when he was life 
flighted to the hospital. R. 533:9. This fact, together with Tripp's failure to yield 
the right of way, established probable cause that Tripp was guilty of at least 
negligent homicide, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (West 2004) 
(making it a class A misdemeanor when a person acts with criminal negligence 
and causes the death of another). Although additional facts may have been 
required to support a conviction for negligent homicide, see State v. Larsen, 2000 
UT App 106, f^ 18, 999 P.2d 1252 (requiring more than mere advertence), the 
failure to yield, together with the unobstructed view, daylight hour, and clearly 
marked stop sign, was sufficient to establish probable cause of negligent 
homicide. 
Additionally, and contrary to Tripp's claim on certiorari, police had 
probable cause to believe that Tripp was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, 
and hence, probable cause to believe that he was guilty of automobile homicide. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (West 2004). Detective Roberts testified that 
when he first observed Tripp, he noticed that she was shaking and nervous, and 
that her eyes were red, but attributed it to the emotional trauma of the accident. 
R. 533:11. However, as he conversed with Tripp over the next 45 minutes, he 
suspected that she was impaired. R. 533:14. 
-14-
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Roberts explained that although he did not see her cry, the redness in her 
eyes did not dissipate as he would expect if it had been caused from crying. R. 
533: 14, 36-37. He also noted that she was smoking continually and did not 
seem to exhibit a concern for the victim. R. 533:14. He testified that based on 
his experience, he would have expected the redness in her eyes to dissipate. The 
water in her eyes cleared, but the redness did not. He also noted that she was 
smoking continually. Although Tripp may have been smoking to calm her 
nerves, she may also have been smoking to mask an odor of alcohol. Courts 
have repeatedly been counseled to "'accord deference to an officer's ability to 
distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions/" State v. Markland, 2005 
UT 26,111,112 P.3d 507 (quoting United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,1268 
(10th Cir. 2001)); accord United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) 
(" allow [ing] officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to 
make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 
available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person'"). 
Tripp contends that probable cause was lacking because some of the 
factors identified by the State are susceptible to an innocent explanation. Tripp 
argues, for example, that her shakiness and nervousness can be a normal 
response for someone involved in a fatal accident, that she may not have seen 
the motorcyclist due to the terrain or her own doorpost, or that the motorcyclist 
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may have been speeding or failed to properly apply his brakes. Resp. Brf. at 30, 
38,40. 
The law is well settled, however, that" [a]lthough there might be innocent 
explanations for particular conduct, it is not necessary that all legitimate reasons 
be absent before an officer finds probable cause/' State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531,535 
(Utah 1994). As observed in Illinois v. Gates,"innocent behavior frequently will 
provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; to require otherwise would 
be to sub silentio impose a drastically more rigorous definition of probable cause 
than the security of our citizens demands/' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,244-45 
n.l3(1983). 
Tripp also exaggerates the evidence. She contends that her view may 
have been obstructed because of the terrain, but a video introduced as an exhibit 
demonstrates excellent visibility and testimony established that the recession in 
the terrain was almost one-half a mile (3/8 of a mile) away. See SE; R. 533:59-60. 
Tripp contends that according to Detective Roberts, the motorcyclist may have 
been traveling up to 90 miles per hour. See Resp. Brf. at 30,41. The effect of his 
testimony, however, was that he had no idea how fast the motorcyclist was 
traveling. See R. 525: 373; R. 532: 32-35. The only credible evidence regarding 
speed showed that the victim was traveling the speed limit. Roberts testified 
that the speed limit for the victim was 60 miles per hour, R. 526: 425-28, and a 
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witness of the accident said the victim "appeared to be driving safely, the speed 
limit/' R. 525:177-79? Moreover, based on all of the facts available during the 
investigation, the accident investigator estimated that the victim was traveling 
between 59.8 and 60.37 miles per hour when he began to brake. R. 526:475-77.4 
Tripp contends that her detention was nevertheless unlawful because the 
officers "incorrect[ly] belie[ved] that blood draws are routinely taken in serious 
accidents, and that the police had the legal right to demand a blood sample from 
Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute/' Resp. Brf. at 29 (internal 
citations to record omitted). But an officer's understanding of the law, whether 
correct or mistaken, has no bearing on the lawfulness of an arrest or custodial 
detention. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has made "clear that an 
3
 Contrary to Tripp's claim, Resp. Brf. at 40, the State's evidence of the 
speed limit was not conflicting. The only suggestion at trial that the speed limit 
was 50 m.p.h. came in response to cross-examination questions from defense 
counsel. See R. 525:177-78; R. 526: 510,517. At a prior hearing, Officer Roberts 
had indicated that the speed limit was 50 m.p.h., but clarified at trial that the 
speed limit changed to 50 m.p.h. for southbound traffic on Highway U-l l l after 
the intersection with the Old Bingham Highway. See R. 526: 426-27. 
4
 Defendant points to testimony indicating that the victim "may have been 
going faster." Resp. Brf. at 40 (citing R. 526:505,514). The testimony, however, 
was that the victim may have been going faster if he was applying both his front 
and rear brakes. R. 526:505,514-15. But as acknowledged by Tripp in her brief, 
"[t]he physical evidence showed that prior to the collision, [the victim] was 
applying only his rear brake." Resp. Brf. at 40-41 (citing R. 526: 475). In any 
event, the fact that a driver may be speeding does not forfeit her right-of-way to 
a driver who is required to stop at the intersection. See Cintron v. Milkovich, 611 
P.2d 730,732 (Utah 1980); accord Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-902 (West Supp. 2005). 
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arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant 
to the existence of probable cause." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,153 (2004). 
Accordingly, an officer's "subjective reason for making [an] arrest need not be 
the criminal offense as to which the known facts provided probable cause." Id. 
As repeatedly explained by the Supreme Court," 'the fact that the officer does 
not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide 
the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken 
as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'" Id. 
(quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128,138 (1978)). 
In sum, Tripp's failure to yield to the motorcyclist under conditions that 
would suggest she could clearly see him, together with her condition as assessed 
by Officer Roberts, created probable cause to believe she may have been 
intoxicated. Accordingly, Tripp's detention was lawful and her consent was 
valid. 
E. In any event, Tripp's consent to the blood draw was not the 
product of the detention. 
Even assuming arguendo that the detention was unlawful, the evidence 
should nevertheless be admitted because it was "'sufficiently attenuated to 
dissipate the taint' of [any] illegality." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, \ 44,164 
P.3d 397. 
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"Evidence will not be excluded as fruit of an illegal search or seizure if the 
illegality is not the 'but for' cause of the evidence's discovery/' Id. at ]f 43. 
Additionally, evidence will not be excluded "if it is 'sufficiently attenuated to 
dissipate the taint' of the illegality." Id. In determining whether a police 
illegality has tainted a subsequent consent, "a court 'evaluates the relationship 
between official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine 
if excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities.'" Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, at 1[ 62 (quoting State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995)). 
Three factors bear "particular relevance" in making this assessment: "(1) the 
'purpose and flagrancy' of the illegal conduct, (2) 'the presence of intervening 
circumstances,' and (3) the 'temporal proximity' between the illegal detention 
and consent." Id. at f 64 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,603-04 (1975)). 
The State concedes that the third factor—the temporal proximity between 
the detention and consent—would weigh in favor of suppression. Only some 15 
minutes elapsed between the time Tripp was escorted to the unmarked patrol 
car and her consent to Brian Davis. See R. 533:93; Hansen II, 2002 UT 125, at \ 69 
(holding that "'[a] brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and 
consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have 
not had time to dissipate'") (quoting Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293). The other 
two factors, however, mitigate against suppression. 
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Police, however, did not flagrantly violate Tripp's rights, but acted in an 
effort to comply with the Fourth Amendment. After concluding that Tripp 
would not consent to a blood draw, Officer Roberts detained her not to compel 
her consent, but to secure her until he obtained a warrant for the blood draw. 
See R. 533: 32. He did not follow through with a warrant only because Davis, 
who arrived shortly after Tripp was placed in the car, subsequently obtained her 
consent. R. 533:18. 
Davis's admonition that she did not have to consent to the blood draw 
further dissipated any taint. This Court has recognized that "[intervening 
circumstances ... include such events as an officer telling a person he or she has 
the right to refuse consent or to consult with an attorney." Hansen, 2002 UT125, 
at [^ 68. Such an admonition was given here. Before obtaining her consent, 
Davis advised Tripp that she had the right to refuse consent and told her that it 
was "a decision she had to make on her own." R. 533: 93. He also advised her 
that she had the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. R. 533:93. Even 
after being so advised, Tripp consented. 
In sum, although only a brief time elapsed between the detention and 
consent, suppression is not warranted because the detention was not flagrant, 
but for the purpose of securing her until a warrant was obtained, and because 
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Davis advised her that she had the right to refuse consent and the right to 
counsel, an intervening act that effectively purged any taint. 
F. Where the appellate court did not address factors relevant to the 
probable cause determination, the Court can only assume that it 
did not consider them. 
As noted in the State's opening brief, the court of appeals failed to 
consider a number of factors that support a probable cause finding. See Pet. Brf. 
at 23-27. Tripp responds that "[a]ppellate courts are not required to detail in 
writing each fact considered. .. prior to the issuance of any opinion/' Resp. Brf. 
at 36. In support, he cites this Court's decision in State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291,303 
(Utah 1992). Allen does not support Tripp's claim. 
In Allen, the Court addressed in writing several issues raised by the 
defendant on appeal. See id. However, "[i]n accord with the established 
principles of review applicable to all cases," the Court " decline [d] to analyze 
and address in writing [the remaining] issue [s] or claim[s] raised" by the 
defendant. Id. at 303. In this case, however, the court of appeals did, in fact, 
address the issue of probable cause. See Tripp, 2008 UT App 388, f 22. Allen, 
therefore, is inapposite. 
Because probable cause is based on an assessment of all the 
circumstances, see State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986), the court of 
appeals' opinion should include all of the facts relevant to that determination. 
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Where it did not/the parties, and this Court, can only conclude that it did not 
consider them. Moreover, the guidance to courts, the bar, and law enforcement 
that written opinions are intended to provide is greatly diminished where facts 
relevant to the issue are inadvertently omitted.5 
G. The odor of alcohol is an appropriate consideration in the 
probable cause analysis. 
Tripp asserts that"there is no evidence that [police] were informed of an 
odor of alcohol or slurred speech prior to the blood draw/7 and as a result, that 
evidence cannot be considered in determining probable cause. Resp. Brf. at 43. 
The assertion is not true. Cecelia Budd, the victim advocate, testified that when 
she first arrived on the scene and poked her head into the car to see how Tripp 
was doing, she smelled the odor of alcohol, but could not tell whether it was 
coming from defendant. R. 533: 76,83. She further testified that she notified a 
5
 Tripp makes the same argument with respect to the court of appeals' 
failure to consider facts favorable to a finding of voluntary consent. See Resp. 
Brf. at 18-19. That argument fails for the same reasons. 
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police officer of that fact. R. 533: 84. Accordingly, the odor of alcohol was an 
appropriate factor in assessing probable cause.6 
In any event, Detective Roberts testified that in order to obtain the 
warrant, he "ha[d] to review all the information with the officers at the scene,... 
call another detective to come and help [him] draft the warrant and . . . review 
the warrant with the district attorney[,] and then have it signed by a district 
court judge." R. 533: 18-19. That investigation would have undoubtedly 
revealed not only Budd's observations, but also Davis's observations. 
Moreover, probable cause may be based on the collective knowledge of all 
those involved in the investigation of a crime. See United States v. Perkins, 994 
F.2d 1184, 1189 (6th Cir.) (recognizing that the collective knowledge of all 
officers may add up to probable cause), cert, denied 510 U.S. 901 (1993). The 
court of appeals recently explained: 
"It is not. . . necessary that such objectively reasonable articulable 
suspicion rest solely on the knowledge of the detaining officer. 
Rather, the collective knowledge doctrine (sometimes referred to as 
the fellow officer rule) allows the objectively reasonable articulable 
6
 Tripp complains that the trial court erred in finding that Budd smelled 
alcohol on Tripp when she first spoke with her. Resp. Brf. at 23-24. While it is 
true that the source of the alcohol may not have been certain at that point, it was 
still a factor supporting probable cause. Indeed, it was Tripp with whom she 
was speaking and thus she was the most likely source. Moreover, Budd 
confirmed that the odor of alcohol was coming from Tripp when she smelled it 
emanating from her person in the patrol car. See R. 533: 78-79, 86-87. 
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suspicion to be based on the totality of the circumstances and 'the 
collective knowledge of all the officers involved.'" 
State v. Prows, 2007 UT App 409, t 13,178 P.3d 908 (quoting United States v. 
Watkins, No. 06-3271,243 Fed.Appx. 356,358 (10th Cir. June 14,2007) (quoting 
United States v. Hinojos, 107 F.3d 765,768 (10th Cir.1997), and citing United States 
v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223,1226 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Miranda-Guerena, 
445 F.3d 1233,1237 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Cervine, 347 F.3d 865,871 (10th 
Cir.2003)). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the opening brief, the State 
respectfully requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted September 3,2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
JEFFREY S. GRAY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
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